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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate, using some conventional concepts and procedures from 
the discipline of economics, the economic rationale for governments to have suicide prevention policies. This is 
a conceptual paper, which proceeds in a theoretical fashion. The part of the economics literature that is relevant 
to this task is welfare (or normative) economics, not positive or empirical economics. Welfare economics is that 
part of economics which is concerned with evaluating whether some change in the human environment 
(economic, social, political etc) has increased social welfare. The motivation of this paper is to show that a 
suicide prevention policy involves a legitimate role of government, given the conventional framework of welfare 
economics. It may seem puzzling to suicidologists that it is necessary to argue an economic case for suicide 
prevention, given that suicide prevention seems established in contemporary civil society. That it is ‘well-
established’ is a view that does not always apply ‘outside the circle’ of suicidology.  The case for policy is 
dubious amongst some with a contemporary concern for environmental degradation. This argument is that a 
laissez-faire approach to suicide is appropriate in order to protect the planet. This paper shows that there is no 
economic case for a ‘no policy’ stance with respect to suicide prevention.  
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*It is well-known that suicide rates in 
various western countries have, in the recent past, 
been rising, and that governments in a number of 
countries have developed suicide prevention 
policies in response. Furthermore it has been 
pointed out by, inter alia, Cutler, Glaeser, & 
Norberg (2001) that these increases have been 
concentrated among the young. Details of 
governmental concerns have been outlined in 
various publications, for example, Department of 
Health (2000) for England, Commonwealth 
Department of Human Services and Health (1995) 
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for Australia, US Public Health Service (1999) for 
the United States, etc.  
 
 At a 2006 Health Economics conference in 
London, some joint-authored work on suicide 
(Doessel, Williams, & Robertson, 2010), was 
subject to some heated criticism on conservation 
grounds by a conference participant. Although the 
paper was concerned with suicide measurement 
issues, particularly discussion of two measures of 
suicide enumeration and the calculation of time-
series statistics on the distribution of suicide (per 
se), there were some prefatory remarks about 
suicide prevention policies. It was briefly argued 
that such policies were appropriate and justified in 
terms of general economic theory. It was this 
general argument justifying a suicide prevention 
policy that the conference participant found 
objectionable.  
 
 By implication, this same argument can be 
levelled against the activities of all clinicians who 
work in the field of suicide prevention and self-
harm. For such clinicians the aim is clearly 
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prevention; Shneidman (1996, p. 7) writes as 
follows: ‘Our constant goal is prevention.’ See also 
Joiner (2005, p. 223) who writes of his ‘agenda of 
prevention and relief of suffering’.   
 
 The motivation of our investigation, into 
whether or not an economic case for a suicide 
prevention policy exists, arose from this short 
exchange during that conference discussion session 
(and upon which we elaborate shortly). This 
audience-member presented a line of argument, viz. 
that suicide prevention conflicts with Gaia-based 
views, also elaborated shortly.  In this introductory 
paragraph, the point simply is to say, by way of 
preamble, that his argument caused us  to puzzle 
over his stance: does ‘being Green’ mean one 
supports the lack of a suicide prevention policy?  
The implication of his idea is that apathy in 
government towards suicide prevention policy is 
appropriate. Not convinced by this argument (a 
stance that this paper proves can be legitimate), the 
rationale here extends further, and beyond its 
original motivation relating to ‘Gaia-type’ stances.  
In its broader rationale, the paper demonstrates the 
appropriate approach to be taken to refuting any 
argument supporting apathy towards suicide 
prevention policy, or resignation towards the 
increasing trend in suicide. Being apathetic towards 
suicide prevention is, sadly, commonplace. Our 
argument here, based on conventional welfare 
economics, clearly demonstrates there to be a 
legitimate economic role of government in 
implementing effective suicide prevention policy. 
In the Discussion section below, we explain (to 
suicidologists in particular) why there is a need for 
this paper in the first place. We address a need here 
that may seem unnecessary to scholars of 
suicidology, and yet is not an argument that is 
necessarily obvious to all. 
 
Suicide versus Carbon Footprints, and the Role 
of Economics 
 
 The conference participant argued that 
governments should have no policy on suicide: 
suicide was to be (literally) a laissez-faire issue on 
which government should be silent, and non-
interventionist. It was argued that it was now well-
known that all people have ‘carbon footprints’, a 
concept derived from the ‘ecological footprint’. For 
some details, see Wackernagel & Rees (1996), 
Chambers, Simmons, & Wackernagel (2000) and 
Wackernagel et al. (2002). Advocates of these 
concepts are concerned with measuring the impact 
of human activities on the physical environment 
(and several internet sites on the Web enable site 
users to ply a carbon calculator with details of one’s 
daily activities to determine one’s ‘footprint’). In a 
‘carbon footprints’ conception, particular attention 
is directed to the quantities of greenhouse gases 
produced by our daily activities such as the use of 
electricity, fuels for heating and transport etc. This 
ecological concern, it was argued, is derived from 
the ‘Gaia hypothesis’, as stated, for example, in 
Lovelock’s (1995) book, Gaia: A new look at life 
on earth, first published in 1979.  Lovelock’s view 
is that ‘the living earth’ functions as a single 
organism, and that there is a self-regulating system 
(Gaia) which involves physical, chemical, 
biological (including ‘human’) phenomena. This 
system has a goal, namely ‘the regulation of surface 
conditions so as always to be as favourable as 
possible for contemporary life’ (Lovelock, 2006, p. 
162). 
 
 Since his early ‘Gaia’ publications in the 
1970s, Lovelock’s views have changed, and more 
recently, in his Revenge of Gaia, he has argued that 
humans, by such activities as reducing biodiversity 
and clearing forests, have damaged Gaia’s ability to 
self-regulate and regenerate the earth (Lovelock, 
2006). His more pessimistic view is a result of 
mankind’s continuing neglect of the environmental 
effects of current human behaviour.   
 
 It is not our purpose here to critique the 
Gaia hypothesis: there are many such critiques, 
from, inter alia, Richard Dawkins (1982) and 
Stephen Jay Gould (1997).  (In some circles, 
exception is taken to regarding or describing 
Lovelock’s arguments as a ‘hypothesis’, as in the 
previous sentence: for some it is a ‘law’, and for 
others it is a teleology.)  Our purpose is simply to 
report that this concept was the source of the view 
that suicide should not be prevented: if people 
wished to end their lives, then that was up to them, 
and, as a result, mother earth would be subject to 
fewer environmental pressures, given their 
decisions. Thus, a Gaia-type concern leads to the 
view, for our conference participant, that there is no 
economic role for government to have a suicide 
prevention strategy. For this participant the use of 
economic resources by government to prevent 
suicide is inappropriate.  
 
 This paper is concerned with elaborating 
the view that a suicide prevention strategy is a 
legitimate economic policy for governments to 
pursue. Thus, the paper is concerned with the 
discrete choice between ‘there is to be a policy’ or 
‘there is to be no policy’. As a result, the paper does 
not even allude to issues such as the content of 
suicide prevention, including ‘universal’, ‘selective’ 
or ‘indicated’ programs, using the framework 
suggested by Gordon (1983). More detailed 
frameworks such as those of Mzarek and Haggerty 
(1994), Raphael (2000) and the LIFE conception 
(Australian Department of Health and Ageing, 
2008) are also absent. Absent also is the application 
of economic and health-related literatures such as 
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the ‘capabilities’ approach of Sen (1985), 
Nussbaum & Sen (1993) and the more recent 
‘human flourishing’ approach of Ruger (2009). The 
literature on prevention, and the more general 
economics and health-related literatures, are 
relevant to ‘within-policy’ choices that arise once it 
is established that there will be a policy. Such 
literatures as those just mentioned can guide policy 
content. But this paper addresses the prior 
economic question: ‘should there be a policy on 
suicide prevention?’ The literatures just mentioned 
are not germane to this discrete question. 
 
 In this context it is relevant to clarify the 
part of economic theory that is being considered 
here: economic analyses can be separated into two 
types, empirical or descriptive analyses, and 
normative or prescriptive work. (The first category 
is often referred to as ‘positive economics’ and the 
latter category as ‘welfare economics’.) In other 
words, economic analysis can describe the 
economic world or prescribe for it. Although 
positive economics can provide an important 
component for normative analysis, work with a 
focus on policy generally fits within the second 
category. In this context it is useful to recall 
Mishan’s statement on the role of welfare 
economics: ‘normative or welfare economics can be 
defined as the study of criteria for ranking 
alternative economic situations on the scale of 
better or worse’ (Mishan, 1981, p. 3). Similarly 
another much-quoted definition also highlights 
policy choice as the central characteristic of 
normative economics: ‘Welfare economics is the 
theory of how and by what criteria economists and 
policy makers make or ought to make their choices 
between alternative policies’ (Arrow & Scitovsky, 
1969, p. 1). The ‘alternative economic situations’ or 
‘alternative policies’ that are relevant to this paper 
are to have a suicide prevention policy (thus using 
public or private resources for this objective), or not 
to have such a policy, and having no resources 
allocated to the objective. 
 
 This paper will employ the conventional 
analytic and algebraic tools of welfare economics 
(Baumol & Wilson, 2001) in order to demonstrate 
that effective suicide prevention raises social 
welfare, and hence such a policy is justified. It will 
be argued below that this is an issue that invokes, 
not empirical economics, but that branch of 
economics which is concerned with what should be 
done by government, i.e. normative or welfare 
economics. 
 
 An Analysis from Welfare Economics  
 
 It is useful to observe that there are some 
areas of study, e.g. astronomy, physics etc, where 
the concern is to understand the phenomena in 
question, in part to predict events. Thus, a 
normative branch of the relevant discipline does not 
exist. (This does not imply that ethical critiques do 
not exist: see Pringle & Spiegelman (1982) for a 
critical account of the nuclear industry, a by-
product of theoretical physics. But the point is that 
such a critique is not ‘within’ physics.) 
 
 But economics is not like that: in the 
history of the discipline, issues of ‘what should be 
done’ were central to the concerns of the ‘founding 
fathers’, not simply in the English-language 
literature but also in literatures from continental 
Europe. See, in particular, the Scandinavian and 
Italian contributions to public finance (Musgrave & 
Peacock, 1958) and the Italian literature on public 
happiness (pubblica  felicita) and civic virtues, such 
as public trust (fede pubblica). See Bruni (2006) for 
details. Some examples of historical policy issues 
were free trade vs protection, the desirability of 
accumulating and preserving stocks of a country’s 
precious metals, e.g. gold and silver, as a policy 
objective as advocated by the Mercantalists; a 
disproportionate emphasis on a single industry, 
agriculture, a policy prescription of the Physiocrats; 
the German romantics, e.g. Muller, arguing for the 
exemption of land and its produce from taxation, 
etc.   
 
 The historical term for these early 
contributions to economics is ‘political economy’. 
The part of contemporary economics that continues 
these policy concerns about ‘what should be done’ 
is now called welfare, or normative, economics.  
(The state of positive economics, i.e. testing 
hypotheses or economic models of economic 
behaviour etc, was at that time embryonic.) 
However, contemporary economic problems are 
somewhat different from those mentioned above. 
Some that come to mind are as follows: whether 
government should subsidise the production of cars 
with hybrid engines; whether country X should join 
the customs union, now called the European Union; 
whether investment in a new railway line is 
economically viable; whether we should conserve 
places of natural beauty, and how much should be 
preserved, etc. These are ultimately political 
questions, but insofar as they are subjected to 
economic analysis, the relevant literature that is 
applicable is welfare economics. Attention is 
directed here to applying some relevant parts of 
welfare economics to the topic which is under 
examination here, i.e. is a suicide prevention 
program a legitimate function of government 
policy? 
 
 Let us recognise that not all people share a 
concern for suicide prevention: some admire the 
suicides of honour, love, idealism, epitomised 
historically by the acts of Cleomenes, Hippo, 
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Seneca, Lucretia, Brutus, Pythagoras etc (Minois, 
1999). Yet again, there is the concept of the absurd 
in existentialist thought that, for some existentialist 
writers, leads to suicide being regarded as quite 
understandable: as there is no purpose, value or 
meaning in the world or to life, suicide is an 
understandable response. See Orbach (2007). But, 
for Camus, although suicide was the ‘one truly 
serious philosophical problem’ (Camus, 1955 p. 3-
4), his disposition was to struggle and revolt against 
the absurd (Camus, 1960). Rebellion, for Camus, 
implies dissatisfaction with the human condition, 
i.e. one needs to face the absurd, and make a 
decision in favour of life. See Lengers (1994) for a 
discussion of Camus’ perspective for the role of 
health professionals. Camus, it must be said, was in 
conflict with some of the major French writers 
(including Sartre, who at the time was justifying 
Stalinism), following the publication of The Rebel 
with its anti-totalitarian theme. In fact, Camus had 
been ostracised by the ‘left-bank intellectuals’ of 
Paris. Lenzini, a recent biographer of Camus, writes 
as follows: ‘He would remain an outsider in this 
world of letters, confined to existential purgatory… 
He was not part of it. He never would be. And they 
would never miss the chance to let him know that’ 
(Lenzini, 2009, p. 76).  But this is a digression: 
public policy, in large part, is oblivious to these 
types of arguments. 
              
 Let us now begin by restating the central 
points of the first paragraph of this paper. Suicide 
as a cause of death is increasing in many countries 
and is being identified by many governments as a 
social problem. In response, some governments 
have adopted policies concerned with addressing 
suicide through preventive action. This implies an 
inverse relationship between community welfare 
and suicide. The impact of suicide upon society can 
be measured by the reduction in the length of life, 
or longevity, that results from an act of suicide. 
Furthermore, politicians and bureaucrats say that it 
is a greater tragedy when young people take their 
own lives. Thus community welfare falls even more 
when the young take their own lives.  
  
 One way of describing the points made in 
the paragraph above is to say that the (partial) 
social welfare function (W1) has two arguments, viz. 
the total social loss from suicide, and the 
distribution of age-at-death from suicide. Thus, 
 
),(1 ss EISLfSfW =    (1) 
 
where SLfS is the social loss from suicide, and 
ss EI is the notation for ‘inequality/equality’ in 
the distribution of age-at-death from suicide. (We 
work with a partial social welfare function, i.e. 
abstracting from goods and services consumed (for 
the moment), as well as the non-economic 
determinants of welfare as outlined by Bergson 
(1938), as these variables will simply ‘clutter’ the 
exposition.) Goods and services will be 
incorporated below. Also, it will be shown that 
equation (1) is partial in that it takes no account of 
time. 
  
 Before proceeding to issues of 
measurement of the two variables in (1), as outlined 
in Doessel et al. (2010), it is relevant to place these 
concerns in the wider framework of welfare 
economics.  
 
 A conventional approach in welfare 
economics is to specify social welfare (W) as an 
(undefined) function of the utility levels of the n 
individuals who comprise the community.  Thus we 
may write: 
 
),...,,( 21 nUUUfW =   (2) 
 
where iU  is the utility level of person i , where i = 
1,2, …,n.   (It is not necessary in this context to 
specify any relationship, say the additive form of 
the Cambridge School, between the Ui in equation 
(1).)  There are some very important value 
judgements associated with equation (2), as 
elaborated by Nath (1969). However, these value 
judgements are not central to this paper and will not 
be considered. 
 
 Dissatisfaction with such a social welfare 
function, equation (2), arose during the debate on 
welfare criteria initiated by Kaldor (1939), and was 
quickly followed by contributions from Hicks 
(1940) and Scitovsky (1941). Some parts of this 
literature are quite abstract (and employ some 
standard welfare concepts such as commodity 
space, utility space, the community indifference 
map, the situation utility-possibility curve etc: thus 
some of the arguments require some technical 
understanding of welfare economics). Given the 
abstract nature of some of the content, it is useful to 
give some examples of what the literature was 
considering. At the very beginning of the welfare 
criteria debate, the policy issue of repeal of the 
(British) Corn Laws by the Peel government in 
1846 was considered. This issue is a manifestation 
of the free trade vs protection debate.  Abolition of 
the tax (a tariff) on grain imports to Britain would 
have the effect of making some people worse off 
(the owners of British agricultural land, who had 
been receiving super-normal profits because the 
tariff had increased domestic grain prices.)  On the 
other hand, abolition would make another group 
better off, i.e. British consumers of grains (bread 
etc) who would benefit from lower prices. This is a 
straightforward case of welfare changes between 
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producers and consumers. The ultimate policy 
question was as follows: was repeal of the Corn 
Laws (decreasing tariffs on imports of grains to 
Britain) ‘a good thing’?  
 
 However it may be helpful to mention 
some more contemporary policy changes. Consider 
a government contemplating the construction of a 
new freeway from the central business district of a 
well-established city to outlying suburbs. Such a 
change in the economic environment will make 
some people better off (commuters etc) and some 
worse off, e.g. people whose properties are resumed 
(often at less than market prices because of the 
eminent domain power of government), as well as 
the remaining residents who are now subject to 
noise pollution. A little reflection indicates that 
there are likely to be few changes such that no one 
in society is made worse off. 
 
 The welfare criteria debate started with 
Kaldor’s argument that a policy change (on tariffs, 
a freeway etc) was desirable (on economic 
efficiency grounds) if some of the gains to the 
gainers could be used to compensate the losers for 
their losses, and hence everyone could be made 
better off. For Kaldor, this compensation test (also 
called the compensation ‘principle’ or ‘criterion’) 
was an objective test of economic efficiency, and 
policy prescriptions based on it were ‘scientific’, in 
that they were devoid of any value judgement. It 
should be emphasised that Kaldor did not require 
that compensation be paid: whether hypothetical 
compensation became actual compensation was a 
political question, not an economic question. 
 
 What Kaldor, and later Hicks (1940), were 
doing was using compensation as a conceptual 
‘wedge’ (or a sharp conceptual distinction) between 
efficiency and distribution, which effectively swept 
distribution out of view. Leaving aside Scitovsky’s 
(1941) ‘paradox’ paper, which is not relevant in this 
present context, the next contribution was from 
Little (1949), whose arguments were subsequently 
elaborated in Little (1957).  Little argued forcefully 
that value judgements (particularly about 
distribution) are central to welfare economics and 
cannot be avoided or swept out of sight. 
Furthermore those value judgements should not be 
hidden or suppressed, but should be stated 
explicitly, and arguments given for their adoption. 
But if the value judgements underlying the 
compensation test are clearly stated, the policy may 
find little public support. As compensation does not 
have to be paid, the test is consistent with making 
the poor poorer.  It was Little’s argument that 
Kaldor, Hicks et al. were being misleading by their 
use of persuasive terms (e.g. ‘increase in wealth’, 
‘economic efficiency’ etc). They had separated 
‘efficiency’ and ‘distribution’ only by ignoring the 
latter. The search for a value-free criterion of ‘an 
improvement in economic welfare’ was futile. This 
‘tortuous debate’ , to use Mishan’s (1969) phrase, 
in the theoretical literature culminated in what is 
now called Little’s criterion.  
 
 Little’s position was that distribution must 
be recognised as a relevant variable: is there a 
better distribution associated with the post-policy 
outcome compared with the distributive position of 
the pre-policy position?  Clearly, the answer to this 
question involves a normative judgement. 
  
 Thus, following Little, we may write 
 
);,...,,( 21 UUn EIUUUfW =  (3) 
 
where equation (2) is augmented by UU EI , some 
measure of the distribution of  utility (or welfare) 
between the members of the community, the point 
that had been so forcefully made by Little. 
Distributional effects of any economic change must 
be incorporated into the analysis.  
 
 These theoretical distributional matters 
received some considerable attention in the applied 
literature on social investment appraisal, where a 
number of different empirical approaches were 
developed to incorporate income or wealth 
distribution in cost-benefit analyses.  
 
 The Little criterion involves both the 
provision of efficiency information and 
distributional information to decision-makers. 
Marglin (1962) then suggested that 
planners/economists should aim to present 
information to decision-makers which maximises ‘a 
weighted sum of redistribution and efficiency’. 
Weisbrod devised a way of implementing Marglin’s 
suggestion by inferring distributional weights from 
previous governmental decisions: his procedure 
involves the simultaneous solution to a system of 
equations (Weisbrod, 1968). Neenan (1971) then 
applied this technique in his analysis of an X-ray 
screening programme to detect tuberculosis. 
 
 Another approach to integrating efficiency 
and equity, first suggested by Eckstein (1961), is to 
infer distributional weights from a situation in 
which redistributional issues are at the forefront of 
attention: the personal income tax legislation (in 
western countries) is such a case. Mera (1969) 
devised a procedure to do this and Nwaneri (1970) 
applied the technique in re-working the Roskill 
analysis of the (then proposed) Third London 
Airport. Using the Australian income tax schedule, 
Doessel (1978) applied this procedure in his cost-
benefit study of four alternative methods of treating 
end-stage renal disease. 
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 It is now not atypical to see welfare 
functions such as that indicated in equation (3) in 
the theoretical literature. Graaff’s argument is that 
there is a need to ‘dispense with the time-honoured 
device of drawing a distinction between the size 
and the distribution of national income and saying 
that welfare depends on them both’ (Graaff, 1967). 
This statement is reminiscent of Little’s critique of 
Kaldor: ‘[Kaldor] suggested not a test, but a 
definition, which certainly separated out income 
distribution, but only by ignoring it… We do not 
believe that any definition of an increase in wealth, 
welfare, efficiency, or real social income which 
excludes income distribution is acceptable’ (Little, 
1957, p. 92). See also Fischer (1956), Sheshinski 
(1972) and Fields (1979). More recently, Sen 
(1976) has re-argued the case for incorporating 
distribution in (generally) standard-of-living 
comparisons. He argues that the welfare theory of 
real national income comparisons is deficient 
particularly with respect to income distribution. His 
procedure is to weight goods to different people by 
distributional judgements. Thus, a concern for 
UU EI in the welfare function now has many 
precedents.  
 
 As yet we have not specified the content of 
the utility function, iU , the components of 
equations (2) and (3). It is conventional to say that 
the arguments in iU  are goods/services consumed. 
Thus 
 
),( iii YXfU =    (4) 
 
where iX is the amount good x consumed by 
person i , and iY  is the amount of good y consumed by person i , and given that, 
 
iXX = and iYY = , 
where X and Y are the totals of goods x and y  for 
the community. Thus, equation (3) can be re-
written as  
 
);,( UU EIYXfW =    (3a) 
 
 Note that equations (3) and (3a) are 
timeless.  
 Although the importance of time has been 
recognised in economics in the context of 
investment appraisal since Fisher (1930), it was not 
until 1965, with the publication of ‘A Theory of the 
Allocation of Time’ by Becker (1965), that time 
was incorporated into the body of microeconomics. 
One of Becker’s key points was that the 
consumption of goods actually takes time:  this is 
clearly recognised in the context of attending the 
theatre for a musical concert, a play or a film, 
having a restaurant meal etc: recognition of the 
jointness of consumption of goods and time leads 
quickly to the concept of a time-price associated 
with the money-price of the consumption of a good. 
In the health sector this has led to the calculation of 
time-prices associated with the consumption of 
health care services, the first study being that of 
Acton (1975). 
 
 It is relevant to observe that this jointness 
between the consumption of goods and time is not 
simply restricted to particular consumption goods, 
but is applicable to all consumption goods.  If we 
consider the conventional utility function in 
equation (4), it is clear that this function takes no 
account of the jointness discussed above.  One way 
to recognise this is to re-write equation (4) as 
follows: 
 
),;,( yxiii ttYXfU =    (5) 
 
where xt and yt  are the time periods associated 
with the consumption of iX and iY . It is important 
to note that this equation is exactly the same as 
Becker’s (1965) equation (4), with the exception of 
notation. 
 
 In equation (5), it is recognised that time 
(associated with consumption) is an argument in the 
utility function for person i. Summing across n 
persons, we have total time (T) as follows: 
 
yx
n
i
ttT ,
1=
=  
 
 It is also useful to state the following 
identity: 
 
i
n
i
tT
1=
=  
 
where ti is the length of life of person i. 
 
 Given that time enters the utility function, 
there is but a small step to recognise that time also 
enters the social welfare function (W). Thus we 
may re-write equation (3a) as follows: 
 
);;,( TEIYXfW UU=   (3b) 
 It is conventionally, and uncontroversially, 
assumed that W is increasing in X and Y: given that 
T is jointly involved with X and Y, it follows that W 
is also increasing in T. Thus the period of time 
during which consumption is available, i.e. the total 
period of life of the members of the community, is 
also an argument in the social welfare function and 
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increases W. Thus, the longevity of the 
community’s members is a variable which 
contributes to social welfare. 
 
 It follows from equation (3b) that death 
from any cause (including suicide) will decrease the 
value of the social welfare function (W). Given that 
inequality/equality (associated with goods) is an 
argument in the welfare function, and that people 
jointly combine goods and time, it follows that the 
distribution of time is also a component of W. Thus 
we may write:  
 
);;;,( TTUU EITEIYXfW =  (3c) 
 
 Let us now return to equation (1), a 
statement of government concern for the social loss 
from suicide and its distribution. This equation was 
described as a partial social welfare function. Given 
that time (and its distribution), have now been 
shown, as in equation (3c), to be arguments in the 
general social welfare function, the statement of W1 
in equation (1), can be seen to be a part of W in 
equation (3c). In other words, a concern for suicide 
(and its distribution) can be regarded as part of the 
general body of welfare economics.  
 
 Thus, extensions of modern welfare 
economics provide a justification for time, i.e. 
length of life or longevity, to enter the social 
welfare function. The approach for detecting 
whether a societal intervention (such as a 
prevention policy) has had an impact on suicide 
involves examining suicide data. It has been argued 
elsewhere (Doessel, Williams & Whiteford, 2009a; 
Doessel, Williams & Whiteford 2009b) that the 
appropriate measure for detecting the efficacy of a 
societal intervention is not headcount measures 
(conventional mortality data), but the years of 
unlived lifetime due to suicide, as measured by the 
Potential Years of Life Lost (PYLL), a measure 
first advocated by Dempsey (1947). Such data in 
time-series form provide the material that allows 
analyses of the statistical location, or quantity, of 
suicide and its distribution (Doessel, Williams & 
Robertson, 2010).  
 
 The result of this welfare economic 
analysis is that a concern for suicide and its 
prevention can be incorporated into the 
conventional/traditional discourse of welfare 
economics. This result is of particular relevance and 
importance in this present era: arguments  (based on 
the contemporary concern for environmental 
degradation) proposing that a laissez-faire approach 
to suicide is appropriate, are shown here to have no 
basis in conventional welfare economics.  
 
 Debating and developing effective suicide 
prevention policy is an important step in the 
formation of policy that prevents suicide. Various 
assumptions in terms of social welfare that underlie 
empirical economic research are relevant to such 
debates. These assumptions are made explicit by a 
methodological type of study such as this. The 
study therefore advances the usefulness of the 
empirical information, which can be made available 
to policy makers, for effective suicide prevention 
policy. Effective policy will raise social 
(community) welfare, both in terms of the quantity 
of life lived in a nation, and the distribution of that 
life lived. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Approbation or condemnation of suicide, 
also called at various times self-murder and 
voluntary death, has a long history in human affairs, 
from (at least) the classical heritage of Greece and 
Rome (Minois, 1999). However, government-
funded suicide prevention policies are of much 
more recent origin. This paper is a reaction, or 
response, to an argument, not for suicide per se, but 
against governments having a policy to prevent 
suicide.   
 
 The argument presented here is that the 
application of concepts central to conventional 
welfare economics provides a clear economic 
justification for governments to adopt suicide 
prevention programs. It has been pointed out 
previously that this paper, quite deliberately, does 
not even allude to issues that can be considered 
within suicide prevention programs. Researchers 
who till the field of suicide research and prevention 
may even be surprised at the content of this paper, 
and implicitly may have assumed that funding 
research into effective suicide prevention is ‘a good 
thing’, and thus ‘an obvious case’ for public 
financing. This implicit assumption also applies to 
the provision of suicide-related clinical services: for 
service providers, there may seem no need to justify 
their existence and/or activity. Whilst, for some, the 
need for this paper may seem surprising or even 
unnecessary, this paper indicates that such a view is 
too sanguine in the current climate of community 
attitudes. There are those for whom financing 
suicide prevention services and research into 
effective practice and policy is not obvious; there 
are those for whom the place for such a policy is 
not uncontroversial. Thus, this paper may fill a 
‘gap’ in the suicidology literature in that it 
addresses an issue that many suicidologists may not 
even have realised existed. 
 
 Note that this argument against 
government-funded prevention strategies is equally 
applicable to the preventive role of clinicians who 
work with suicidal and self-harming people. This 
anti-suicide prevention argument has been 
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motivated, not by any argument about abrogating 
people’s right to make choices over all their life 
decisions (including their own existence), but by 
relatively contemporary concerns about 
environmental degradation arising from human 
actions of various kinds. Those concerns, it has 
been argued, lead to the conclusion that suicide 
should not be prevented, in pursuing the cause of 
the long-term survival of the planet.  
 
 Suicide prevention policy can be 
approached along a spectrum of ‘no government 
action’ towards increasing levels of government 
preventive strategies. Various groups in society 
benefit from the position adopted along this 
spectrum, and differing policies affect groups of 
people to varying degrees (i.e. groups characterised 
by age, gender, diagnosis etc). There are important 
welfare implications behind trends in suicide, and 
also behind strategies designed to reduce suicide.  
However, this paper has not been concerned with 
these important issues: rather our concern has been 
to address the issue of whether economic resources 
(for a prevention program and clinical services for 
at-risk people) are justifiably applied by 
government. 
 
 In this context, it is valuable to employ the 
analytical tools of welfare economics in order to 
demonstrate that effective suicide prevention raises 
social welfare. It has been shown here that 
resources spent on suicide prevention strategies 
should raise social welfare, and thus a suicide 
prevention policy is appropriate for government.  
That conclusion has been reached by recourse to 
conceptual arguments at the core of modern welfare 
economics.  
 
 This conclusion is important, as it is 
contrary to a currently fashionable concern for 
alleviating environmental degradation. Although it 
can be argued that the number of suicides, being 
relatively low, will have a negligible impact on the 
planet’s environmental status, we have deliberately 
chosen not to argue on such an empirical basis. 
Rather, we have chosen to address this challenge to 
suicide prevention at a conceptual level, using the 
tools of modern welfare economics: it is clear that 
there is a conflict between this conclusion derived 
from conventional welfare economics and the Gaia-
inspired environmental conservation conclusion. 
 
 The environmental conservation arguments 
outlined at the beginning of this paper, which 
propose that there is no place for such a policy, do 
not even allude to the concepts from conventional 
welfare economics applied here. We note in passing 
that welfare economics is people-focussed, i.e. the 
concern is for the people who comprise the 
community, as manifested in equation (2) etc. It is 
not unreasonable to expect that proponents of 
conservationist views, should they wish to argue 
against the use of resources for suicide prevention, 
do so by addressing the evidence for suicide 
prevention that conventional welfare economics 
produces. 
 
 Thus, the purpose of this paper has been 
served, by outlining the case which refutes the view 
that governments should not allocate taxpayers’ 
resources to the prevention of suicide. Although 
environmental concerns are currently ‘popular’, and 
‘politically correct’, when the environmental 
argument  against suicide prevention is placed in 
the framework of conventional welfare economics, 
that argument is shown to be deficient. In other 
words, this Gaia-derived argument is at odds with 
conventional welfare economics.  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 We wish to acknowledge the assistance of 
Urska Arnautovska, who has kindly made our task 
easier. Also addressing the helpful comments of 
two anonymous referees has considerably improved 
this paper. Needless to say, any remaining errors 
are our responsibility.  
 
 
 
References 
 
Acton, J. (1975). Nonmonetary factors in the 
demand for medical services: Some 
empirical evidence. Journal of Political 
Economy, 83, 595-614. 
Arrow, K., & Scitovsky, T. (1969). General 
introduction. In K. Arrow& T. Scitovsky 
(Eds), Readings in welfare economics (pp. 
1-3.). London: George Allen and Unwin. 
Australian Department of Health and Ageing 
(2008). Living Is For Everyone (LIFE) 
framework. Canberra: Australian 
Department of Health and Ageing. 
Baumol, W., & Wilson, C. (2001). Welfare 
economics. 3 vols. Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar. 
Becker, G. (1965). A theory of the allocation of 
time. Economic Journal, LXXV, 493-517. 
Bergson, A. (1938). A reformulation of certain 
aspects of welfare economics. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 52, 310-334.    
Bruni, L. (2006). Civil happiness: Economics and 
human flourishing in human perspective. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Camus, A. (1955). The myth of Sisyphus and other 
essays. Translated by J. O’Brien. London: 
Hamish Hamilton. 
Camus, A. (1960). The plague. Translated by Stuart 
Gilbert. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
 Suicidology Online  2010; 1:66-75.  
ISSN 2078-5488 
 74 
Chambers, N., Simmons, C., & Wackernagel, M. 
(2000). Sharing nature's interest: 
Ecological footprints as an indicator of 
sustainability. London: Earthscan. 
Commonwealth Department of Human Services 
and Health (1995). Here for life: A 
national plan for youth in distress. 
Canberra: AGPS. 
Cutler, D., Glaeser, E., & Norberg K. (2001). 
Explaining the rise in youth suicide. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Institute of 
Economic Research. 
Dawkins, R. (1982). The extended phenotype: The 
gene as a unit of selection. Oxford: W.H. 
Freeman. 
Dempsey, M. (1947). Decline in tuberculosis: The 
death rate fails to tell the entire story. 
American Review of Tuberculosis, 56, 157-
164. 
Department of Health. (2000). National suicide 
prevention strategy for England. London: 
Department of Health. 
Doessel, D. (1978). An economic analysis of end-
stage renal disease. Canberra: Hospitals 
and Health Services Commission. 
Doessel, D., Williams, R. & Whiteford, H. (2009a). 
The appropriate measure of suicide for 
policy analysis: a comparison of headcount 
and PYLL rates in Australia 1907-2005.  
Archives of Suicide Research, 13, 87-99. 
Doessel, D., Williams, R., & Whiteford, H. 
(2009b). A Re-Assessment of Suicide 
Measurement: Some Comparative PYLL-
Based Trends, Queensland, 1920-2005. 
Crisis, 30, 6-12. 
Doessel, D., Williams, R., & Robertson, J. (2010). 
Changes in the inequality of mental health: 
Suicide in Australia. Health Economics, 
Policy and Law, (in press). 
Eckstein, O. (1961). A survey of the theory of 
public expenditure criteria. In R.W. 
Houghton (Ed.), Public finance: Selected 
readings (pp. 216-276). Harmondsworth: 
Penguin.  
Fields, G. (1979). A welfare economic approach to 
growth and distribution in the dual 
economy. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, XCIII, 325-353. 
Fischer, F. (1956). Income distribution, value 
judgements and welfare. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 70, 380-424. 
Fisher, I. (1930). The theory of interest: As 
determined by impatience to spend income 
and opportunity to invest it. New York: 
MacMillan. 
Gordon, R. (1983). An operational classification of 
disease prevention. Public Health Reports, 
98, 107-109. 
Gould, S. (1997). Kropotkin was no crackpot. 
Natural History, 106, 12-21.  
Graaff, J. de V. (1967). Theoretical welfare 
economics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hicks, J. (1940). The valuation of social income. 
Economica, VII, 105-124. 
Joiner, T. (2005). Why people die by suicide. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press.  
Kaldor, N. (1939). Welfare propositions of 
economics and interpersonal comparisons 
of utility. Economic Journal, XLIX, 549-
552. 
Lengers, F. (1994). The idea of the absurd and the 
moral decision: Possibilities and limits of a 
physician's actions in the view of the 
absurd. Theoretical Medicine & Bioethics, 
15, 243-251. 
Lenzini, J (2009). Quoted in The Economist, 394, 9 
January, 75-76.   
Little, I. (1949). The foundations of welfare 
economics. Oxford Economic Papers, 1, 
new series, 227-246. 
Little, I. (1957). A critique of welfare economics. 
London: Oxford University Press. 
Lovelock, J. (1995). Gaia: A new look at life on 
earth. 3nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Lovelock, J. (2006). The revenge of Gaia: Why the 
earth is fighting back-and how we can still 
save humanity. London: Allen Lane. 
Marglin, S. (1962). Objectives of water-resource 
development: A general statement. In A. 
Maass, M. Hufschmidt, R. Dorfman, 
H.Thomas, S. Marglin,  & G. Fair (Eds.), 
Design of water-resource systems: New 
techniques for relating economic 
objectives, engineering analysis and 
governmental planning. (pp. 159-225). 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press. 
Mera, K. (1969). Experimental determination of 
relative marginal utilities. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 83, 467-477. 
Minois, G. (1999). History of suicide: Voluntary 
death in western culture. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press.  
Mishan, E. (1969). Welfare economics: An 
assessment. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Mishan, E. (1981). Introduction to normative 
economics. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Mrazek, P. & Haggerty, R.I. (1994). Summary. In 
P. Mrazek & R. Haggerty (Eds), Reducing 
risks for mental disorders: Frontiers for 
preventive intervention research. (pp. 1-
67). Washington, DC: National Academy 
Press. 
Musgrave, R., & Peacock, A. (1958). Classics in 
the theory of public finance. London: 
Macmillan. 
 Suicidology Online  2010; 1:66-75.  
ISSN 2078-5488 
 75 
Nath, S. (1969). A reappraisal of welfare 
economics. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul. 
Neenan, W. (1971). Distribution and efficiency in 
benefit-cost analysis. Canadian  Journal of 
Economics, 4, 216-244 
Nussbaum, M., & Sen, A. (1993). The quality of 
life. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Nwaneri, V. (1970). Equity in cost-benefit analysis: 
A case study of the third London airport. 
Journal of Transport Economics and 
Policy, 4, 235-245. 
Orbach, I. (2007). Existentialism and suicide. In A. 
Tomer, G. Eleason, & P. Wong (Eds.), 
Existential and spiritual issues in death 
attitudes (pp.281-316). New York: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Pringle, P., & Spigelman, J. (1982) The nuclear 
barons. London: Joseph. 
Raphael, B. (2000). A population health model for 
the provision of mental health care. 
Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.    
Ruger, J.P. (2009). Health and social justice. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Scitovsky, T. (1941). A note on welfare 
propositions in economics. Review of 
Economic Studies, IX, 77-88. 
Sen, A. (1976). Real national income. Review of 
 Economic Studies, XLIII, 19-39. 
Sen. A. (1985). Commodities and capabilities. 
 Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sheshinski, E. (1972). Relation between a social 
 welfare function and the Gini index of 
 income inequality.  Journal of Economic 
 Theory, 4, 98-91. 
Shneidman, E. (1996). The suicidal mind. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
 US Public Health Service (1999). The Surgeon 
General's call to action to prevent suicide. 
Washington, DC: Department of Health 
and Human Services. 
Wackernagel, M., & Rees, W. (1996). Our 
ecological footprint: Reducing human 
impact on the earth. Philadelphia, Pa.: 
New Society Publishers. 
Wackernagel, M., Schulz, N., Deumling, D., 
Linares, A., Jenkins, M., Kapos, V., 
Monfreda, C., ... Randers, J. (2002). 
Tracking the ecological overshoot of the 
human economy. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 9 July, 
9266–9271. 
Weisbrod, B. (1968). Income redistribution effects 
and benefit-cost analysis. In S. Chase 
(Ed.), Problems in Public Expenditure 
Analysis: Papers Presented at a 
Conference of Experts (pp.177-209). 
Washington, DC: Brookings. 
 












	AB


CDEFEE
FF
DE E!EF"#E  
F$ F%"& "E D%"&F&"
'&E ()F*	
*+#E  ,-FE
E.EED("	 E $
&FF/00111EED("	 E $


	ABCCDE2E&D DF&1E (EFDDAECADCD/
FCCDFADFDAFAF
&FF/00FE!$$ (0E 02"	 	 D030F0DD 





 4&EE (FF&FFE$	ABCCDF2
A  FD5F2ED,DEFE2FD DF $EFFDCDFA DA!"CACC#A

A FC56$FFFE2FF&17E F&$  F&FEF8	ABCCDE
 $ FE D4&$FEF1"FDF&EE2"1E (E FEEEFFE 9:F FE 
  "1"F&F((FF&FEED(" E F&F& D""F&17;

A CDF56$" FF&E17$$E
A
A ADFDAF56$" FF,F $,2ED F&E17


